Int. MicroWork, Time and Risk

Insurance

A risk-averse person offered actuarially fair insurance buys full coverage.

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Insurance trades a small sure loss (the premium) for protection against a large uncertain one. Risk Aversion and Certainty Equivalents tells us why that can be a good trade even when the premium is more than the expected loss.

Key idea

A premium is actuarially fair when it equals the expected payout: probability times loss. At a fair price, a risk-averse person buys full coverage. The most she would pay for full coverage is $W - CE$, where $CE$ is the certainty equivalent of going uninsured; the amount above the expected loss she would accept to pay is her risk premium.

Why it works

Buy $K$ dollars of coverage at $\gamma$ per dollar. Wealth is $W - \gamma K$ with no loss and $W - L + (1 - \gamma)K$ with the loss. Maximize $(1 - \pi)u(W - \gamma K) + \pi\,u(W - L + (1 - \gamma)K)$: $$\pi(1 - \gamma)\,u'(W_{\text{loss}}) = (1 - \pi)\gamma\,u'(W_{\text{no loss}}).$$ At the fair price $\gamma = \pi$ this says $u'(W_{\text{loss}}) = u'(W_{\text{no loss}})$. Because $u'$ falls as wealth rises, the two wealth levels must be equal: full coverage, $K = L$. When $\gamma > \pi$ the buyer keeps part of the risk.
Wealth \$400 thousand, with a 1/4 chance of losing \$256 thousand. The fair premium for full cover is \$64 thousand. Move the premium: she still buys full coverage up to \$76 thousand.

Worked example: Fair premium and the most she would pay

Wealth 400 (thousand dollars); a loss of 256 with probability 1/4; $u = \sqrt{W}$.
  1. Fair premium: $\tfrac{1}{4}(256) = 64$.
  2. Uninsured: $E[u] = \tfrac{3}{4}\sqrt{400} + \tfrac{1}{4}\sqrt{144} = 15 + 3 = 18$, so $CE = 324$.
  3. Full coverage at premium $P$ leaves $400 - P$ for sure. She buys if $400 - P \ge 324$: the most she would pay is 76.
  4. Risk premium: $76 - 64 = 12$.

Answer: Fair premium 64; she would pay up to 76.

Worked example: When the price is above fair

Wealth 100 (thousand), loss 50 with probability 0.1, $u = \ln W$, coverage costs 0.15 per dollar. How much coverage does she buy?
  1. The first-order condition with log utility, $$\dfrac{0.1(0.85)}{50 + 0.85K} = \dfrac{0.9(0.15)}{100 - 0.15K}$$ solves to $K = \dfrac{\pi(1 - \gamma)W - (1 - \pi)\gamma(W - L)}{\gamma(1 - \gamma)}$.
  2. $$K = \dfrac{0.1(0.85)(100) - 0.9(0.15)(50)}{0.15(0.85)} = \dfrac{8.5 - 6.75}{0.1275} \approx 13.7$$
  3. Far less than full cover: at an unfair price she insures only part of the loss.

Answer: About 13.7 thousand dollars of coverage.

Common mistake

Thinking insurance is a bad buy whenever the premium is above the expected loss. Real insurers must charge more than the expected payout to cover their costs, yet buying can still raise a risk-averse person's expected utility: in the first example she gains from any premium up to 76, well above the expected loss of 64. Check: compare the certain wealth after the premium with the certainty equivalent of staying uninsured.
Insurance also changes behavior and attracts some buyers more than others; Moral Hazard and Incentives and Adverse Selection and Lemons take up those problems.

Practice

Pass with 3 right answers, the last 2 in a row. Each right answer earns 3 XP.

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Sources and further reading

  • OpenStax Principles of Microeconomics 3e, ch. 16.2 Insurance and Imperfect Information
  • MIT OpenCourseWare 14.04 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (course scope and lecture topics)
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