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The Federalist Papers

Eighty-five newspaper essays, written in 1787 and 1788 to persuade New York to ratify the Constitution. They are still the most famous explanation of how the Constitution was meant to work. Here is a guide to who wrote them and why, what they argue, and the full text of every paper, with an introduction and the Anti-Federalist essays that argued the other side.

Start with No. 1 All 85 papers The Anti-Federalist side The debate, side by side

What they were

On September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia finished its work and sent the proposed Constitution to the states. It would take effect when conventions in nine of the thirteen states ratified it. In New York the fight was hard. Governor George Clinton and many of the state’s leaders opposed the plan, and newspaper essays signed “Cato” and “Brutus” were already arguing against it.

Alexander Hamilton answered with a series of essays signed “Publius,” after Publius Valerius Publicola, an early Roman who was remembered as a founder of the Roman republic. He recruited James Madison and John Jay to help. The first essay appeared in the Independent Journal on October 27, 1787. Over the next seven months the essays ran in three New York newspapers, the Independent Journal, the New-York Packet and the Daily Advertiser, often several a week, and some were reprinted in other states.

In 1788 the printers J. and A. McLean collected them as a book, The Federalist, in two volumes. The first came out in March 1788 with Nos. 1 to 36. The second, on May 28, 1788, held the rest, including eight new essays (Nos. 78 to 85) that had not yet appeared in the papers. The book’s order and numbering are the ones used today.

The essays were written fast, for a political campaign, by men who were also busy with other work. Even so, readers then and since have found in them a careful account of the reasons behind the Constitution’s design. They are not neutral: they were written to win a vote. Reading the Anti-Federalists alongside them shows what the arguments were about.

New York’s convention met in Poughkeepsie in June 1788, with Anti-Federalists in the majority. By the time it voted, ten other states had ratified, and on July 26, 1788, New York ratified 30 to 27. Historians still discuss how much the essays changed anyone’s vote. Their larger influence came later, as a guide to the Constitution’s meaning.

The authors

Alexander Hamilton (1755 or 1757–1804)

A New York lawyer and former aide to General Washington, and one of New York’s three delegates at the Convention. He planned the series and wrote 51 of the essays, including most of those on defense, taxes, the presidency and the courts. He became the first Secretary of the Treasury.

James Madison (1751–1836)

A Virginian who had studied the history of republics and confederacies before the Convention and kept the fullest notes of its debates. He was in New York as a member of the Confederation Congress. He wrote 29 essays by the usual count, including Nos. 10 and 51. He later proposed the Bill of Rights in the First Congress and became the fourth President.

John Jay (1745–1829)

A New York lawyer and diplomat who had helped negotiate the 1783 peace treaty with Britain and was the Confederation’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He wrote Nos. 2 to 5 on foreign dangers, then fell ill, and later wrote No. 64 on treaties. He became the first Chief Justice of the United States.

Nos. 18 to 20 were written jointly, mostly from Madison’s notes on earlier confederacies, with material from Hamilton; they are usually counted with Madison’s. The essays appeared anonymously. Many readers guessed who the authors were, but lists of who wrote which papers became public only after Hamilton’s death in 1804.

The disputed papers, and how scholars settled them

For a century and a half, no one could say for sure who wrote twelve of the essays: Nos. 49 to 58, 62 and 63. The trouble came from two lists. Shortly before his fatal duel with Aaron Burr in 1804, Hamilton left a memorandum claiming those twelve as his own. (His list also gave No. 54 to Jay by mistake; Jay wrote No. 64.) Years later Madison claimed the same twelve. His list was used in the 1818 edition printed by Jacob Gideon, and he said Hamilton’s list must have been made out in a hurry. Both men were careful writers, and both had reasons to remember accurately, so for a long time historians took sides.

In 1944 the historian Douglass Adair argued from the history of the essays and their ideas that Madison wrote all twelve. Some of the arguments in them match Madison’s known views and his notes from the Convention closely.

Then in 1963 and 1964 two statisticians, Frederick Mosteller and David L. Wallace, tried a new kind of test. Writers use small, common words at steady, personal rates without thinking about it. Hamilton, for example, wrote “upon” far more often than Madison did. Mosteller and Wallace measured how often each man used dozens of such words in essays whose authorship was certain, then used probability (a Bayesian analysis) to compare the twelve disputed essays. Their result: every one of the twelve was much more likely to be Madison’s. The evidence was weakest for No. 55, but it still pointed to Madison. Their study, published as Inference and Disputed Authorship: The Federalist (1964), became a famous early example of using statistics to study writing.

What is agreed: most historians and nearly all later statistical studies, using different methods, credit Madison with the twelve papers, which gives the usual count of 51 for Hamilton, 29 for Madison and 5 for Jay. What is not agreed: some scholars argue that the two men worked together on more papers than the lists show, so that some essays may be partly collaborations; and the exact share of each in the joint papers 18 to 20 is still discussed. On this site, the twelve are marked “disputed” and credited to Madison, as most scholars do.

The plan of the work

In No. 1 Hamilton promised six topics: the usefulness of the Union; the failures of the Articles of Confederation; the need for an energetic government; the plan’s agreement with republican principles; its likeness to New York’s own constitution; and the security it would give to liberty and property. The series grew as it went. The fourth topic became a long tour of the Constitution, part by part, and the last two were touched on only in No. 85. Here is how the papers fall into groups.

Nos. 1. Introduction. Why the question matters and the plan of the series. 1
Nos. 2–14. The usefulness of the Union. Union protects against foreign powers and war between the states, checks faction, helps trade and revenue, saves money, and can work across a large country. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Nos. 15–22. Why the Articles of Confederation fall short. A government that can only make requests of states, and cannot act on individuals, cannot hold the Union together. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Nos. 23–36. An energetic government: defense and taxes. The national government needs full power over defense, the militia and taxation to meet its duties. 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Nos. 37–40. The Convention's task and republican principles. How hard the task was, and whether the plan is truly republican and within the Convention's authority. 37 38 39 40
Nos. 41–46. The powers granted, and the states. A review of the powers given to the Union, the limits on states, and why the states will not be swallowed up. 41 42 43 44 45 46
Nos. 47–51. Separation of powers and checks and balances. How the three branches are kept separate and how each can defend itself against the others. 47 48 49 50 51
Nos. 52–61. The House of Representatives and elections. Qualifications, terms, size, apportionment, and Congress's power over the times, places and manner of elections. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61
Nos. 62–66. The Senate. Equal representation of the states, longer terms, treaties and the trial of impeachments. 62 63 64 65 66
Nos. 67–77. The President. Election, term, re-eligibility, the veto, command, pardons, treaties and appointments, and why energy in the executive matters. 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
Nos. 78–83. The courts. Judicial independence and review, the reach of federal courts, the Supreme Court's role, and trial by jury. 78 79 80 81 82 83
Nos. 84. Objections answered, including the bill of rights. Hamilton's answer to the charge that the Constitution lacks a bill of rights, and other leftover objections. 84
Nos. 85. Conclusion. Why the plan should be adopted now, and amended later if needed. 85

Key ideas

Faction: A group, majority or minority, moved by a shared passion or interest against the rights of others or the good of the whole. Madison thought its causes, above all differences in property, are permanent, so a constitution must control its effects. No. 10
The extended republic: Against the common view that republics must be small, Madison argued that a large one is safer: elected representatives refine public views, and the many interests in a large country make it hard for one faction to form a majority. Anti-Federalists replied that a large republic would be distant and would need force. No. 10, 14, 51
Federalism: Power divided between the national government, with listed powers, and the states, which keep the rest. Madison called the plan partly national and partly federal. No. 39, 45, 46
Separation of powers: Legislative, executive and judicial power held by different hands, because putting them together is “the very definition of tyranny.” Some overlap is allowed and even needed. No. 47, 48
Checks and balances: Each branch gets the means and the motive to resist the others: “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” Examples: the veto, Senate consent to appointments, impeachment, two houses of Congress. No. 51
Energy in the executive: A single President, with a fixed term, a secure salary and real powers, so the government can act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch,” and so the public knows whom to hold responsible. No. 70
Judicial review: Courts must treat the Constitution as a higher law and refuse to apply acts that contradict it; this places the people’s will, expressed in the Constitution, above both legislature and courts. The Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning in Marbury v. Madison (1803). No. 78
The case against a bill of rights: Hamilton argued that a government of listed powers needs no list of rights, and that such a list might imply powers never granted. The Anti-Federalists won this argument in practice: the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, and the Ninth Amendment answers Hamilton’s worry. No. 84

How courts and scholars use them today

Judges, lawyers and historians read The Federalist as evidence of what the Constitution meant to people in 1787 and 1788. Supreme Court Justices have quoted it from the Court’s early years to the present; one scholarly count found it cited in 291 decisions by the year 2000, with Nos. 42, 78, 81, 51 and 32 among the most cited. In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that its authors’ opinions deserved “great respect,” while the Court kept the right to judge whether they were correct.

Justices of very different views cite it, sometimes in the same case. In Printz v. United States (1997), for example, the majority and the dissent both relied on passages from The Federalist (including No. 27) to reach opposite conclusions about whether Congress could require state officers to carry out a federal program.

How much weight the essays deserve is itself debated. Judges and scholars who look to the Constitution’s original meaning often treat them as strong evidence of how informed people understood the text. Others caution that they were persuasive pieces written quickly for one state’s debate, that they speak for three men rather than all the framers or ratifiers, that the authors sometimes disagreed with each other later, and that many ratifying conventions never read them. Both views are held by serious scholars, and readers can weigh the essays as they would any primary source: by asking who wrote them, when, for whom, and why.

A reading plan

The whole work is about 190,000 words, roughly 14 hours of reading. A good plan is one or two papers a day, with an Anti-Federalist piece each week. Use the paragraph numbers to mark passages and the questions at the top of each paper to check your understanding.

Week 1: Why union?. Federalist 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 14. Other side: Cato I, Brutus I–XVI. Read Brutus's argument about large republics (the summary of Brutus I) right after No. 10.
Week 2: What was wrong with the Articles?. Federalist 15, 16, 22, 23, 30, 33. Other side: Federal Farmer I, Henry, June 4, 1788. Notice that the Federal Farmer agrees change is needed.
Week 3: Republic and federalism. Federalist 37, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46. Other side: A Columbian Patriot.
Week 4: Separation of powers, House and Senate. Federalist 47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 57, 62, 63. Other side: Centinel I, Federal Farmer II.
Week 5: The presidency. Federalist 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72. Other side: Cato IV, Henry, June 5, 1788.
Week 6: The courts, rights and the decision. Federalist 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85. Other side: Federal Farmer IV, Mason's Objections, A Plebeian, Henry, June 24, 1788. Finish with the ratification timeline.

Short on time? The essentials in one week: Nos. 1, 10, 39, 51, 70, 78 and 84, with Brutus and the Federal Farmer IV.

Study questions

Why did Hamilton choose to write as “Publius” instead of under his own name? What are the advantages and risks of anonymous political writing?
Explain Madison’s argument in No. 10 that a large republic controls faction better than a small one. Then explain Brutus’s argument that a free republic cannot work over a large territory. Which do you find more convincing, and why?
What is the difference between separation of powers (No. 47) and checks and balances (No. 51)? Give two examples of each from the Constitution.
Hamilton says the courts are “the least dangerous” branch (No. 78). Brutus said they would be the most dangerous. Make the best case for each view.
Read No. 84 and Federal Farmer IV. Why did the Federalists at first oppose a bill of rights, and why did the Anti-Federalists insist on one? How did the Ninth Amendment respond to Hamilton’s worry?
How did statisticians help settle who wrote the disputed papers? What can and can’t word counts prove?
The Federalist was written to win a political argument. How should that affect the way judges and historians use it? Present two different views.
Which of the Federalists’ predictions came true, and which did not? Consider the House, the Electoral College, the states’ power, and the courts.

All 85 papers

Dates and newspapers are those of first publication. Nos. 78 to 85 first appeared in the second volume of McLean’s book edition on May 28, 1788, and were reprinted in the newspapers that summer. “Disputed” marks the twelve papers once claimed by both Hamilton and Madison; most scholars credit Madison.

Filter

No.	Title and summary	Author	First published
Introduction (Nos. 1)
1	General IntroductionHamilton opens the series: Americans must decide whether good government can come from reflection and choice, and he lists the topics to come.	Hamilton	October 27, 1787 The Independent Journal
The usefulness of the Union (Nos. 2–14)
2	Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and InfluenceJay argues that Americans are one people and that a strong Union will protect them from foreign powers.	Jay	October 31, 1787 The Independent Journal
3	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)Jay argues that one national government will give foreign nations fewer just causes for war, because it will keep treaties and the law of nations more faithfully than thirteen states.	Jay	November 3, 1787 The Independent Journal
4	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)Jay continues: foreign nations will look for pretended causes of war, and only a united America can deter them.	Jay	November 7, 1787 The Independent Journal
5	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)Jay finishes the foreign-danger papers: separate American confederacies would become rivals, as England, Scotland and Wales once were, and foreign powers would play them off against each other.	Jay	November 10, 1787 The Independent Journal
6	Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the StatesHamilton argues that if the states split apart they would go to war with one another, because nations and their leaders are moved by ambition, rivalry and passion, and trade does not end wars.	Hamilton	November 14, 1787 The Independent Journal
7	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)Hamilton names the likely causes of war between separate states: western lands, trade rules, the public debt, laws breaking private contracts, and rival foreign alliances.	Hamilton	November 17, 1787 The Independent Journal
8	The Consequences of Hostilities Between the StatesHamilton warns that war among the states would bring standing armies, stronger executives and less liberty, while a Union, like Britain’s island position, makes large armies unneeded.	Hamilton	November 20, 1787 The New-York Packet
9	The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and InsurrectionHamilton argues that a confederate republic guards against faction and rebellion, and he uses Montesquieu, the favorite authority of the Constitution’s opponents, to make his case.	Hamilton	November 21, 1787 The Independent Journal
10	The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)Madison’s most famous paper: faction cannot be removed without destroying liberty, but a large republic with representatives can control its effects.	Madison	November 22, 1787 The Daily Advertiser
11	The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a NavyHamilton argues that a Union can bargain with Europe over trade, build a navy, protect the fisheries and river rights, and create “one great American system.”	Hamilton	November 24, 1787 The Independent Journal
12	The Utility of the Union In Respect to RevenueHamilton argues that one national government could collect far more revenue from import duties, with less smuggling, than separate states could.	Hamilton	November 27, 1787 The New-York Packet
13	Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in GovernmentHamilton argues that one national government would cost less than the several governments that would be needed if the states split into confederacies.	Hamilton	November 28, 1787 The Independent Journal
14	Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory AnsweredMadison answers the objection that the country is too large for a republic: a republic, unlike a direct democracy, can extend over a wide area because representatives meet for the people.	Madison	November 30, 1787 The New-York Packet
Why the Articles of Confederation fall short (Nos. 15–22)
15	The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionHamilton names the great flaw of the Articles: Congress makes rules for states, not for individuals, so it cannot enforce its own laws.	Hamilton	December 1, 1787 The Independent Journal
16	The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)Hamilton argues that coercing states by force would mean civil war, so the national government must have its own courts and officers to enforce laws on individuals.	Hamilton	December 4, 1787 The New-York Packet
17	The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)Hamilton answers the fear that the national government will swallow the states: people’s loyalty runs first to the governments closest to them.	Hamilton	December 5, 1787 The Independent Journal
18	The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)Using ancient Greek leagues, the paper shows how confederacies with weak central councils fell into quarrels and foreign domination.	Madison, with Hamilton joint	December 7, 1787 The New-York Packet
19	The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)The paper reviews the Holy Roman Empire, Poland and the Swiss cantons to show that confederacies of sovereign states are weak and quarrelsome.	Madison, with Hamilton joint	December 8, 1787 The Independent Journal
20	The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)The paper examines the Dutch republic: its union could not raise money or act without unanimous consent, and only a hereditary leader and fear of neighbors held it together.	Madison, with Hamilton joint	December 11, 1787 The New-York Packet
21	Other Defects of the Present ConfederationHamilton lists more defects of the Articles: no power to enforce laws, no guarantee of state governments, and an unfair system of quotas for raising money.	Hamilton	December 12, 1787 The Independent Journal
22	The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)Hamilton finishes his list of the Articles’ defects: no power over trade, a clumsy way to raise armies, equal votes for unequal states, no national courts, and a Congress that rests on the states rather than the people.	Hamilton	December 14, 1787 The New-York Packet
An energetic government: defense and taxes (Nos. 23–36)
23	The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the UnionHamilton begins the case for an energetic government: the powers for common defense must have no limits, because the dangers they meet cannot be foreseen.	Hamilton	December 18, 1787 The New-York Packet
24	The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further ConsideredHamilton answers the objection that the Constitution allows standing armies in peacetime, noting that most state constitutions and the Articles allowed them too.	Hamilton	December 19, 1787 The Independent Journal
25	The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)Hamilton argues that defense should not be left to the states, and that banning peacetime armies would only force the government to break its own rules in an emergency.	Hamilton	December 21, 1787 The New-York Packet
26	The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense ConsideredHamilton argues that the real check on a standing army is that Congress must vote money for it at least every two years.	Hamilton	December 22, 1787 The Independent Journal
27	The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)Hamilton argues that a national government acting directly on citizens will win their respect over time and will rarely need force.	Hamilton	December 25, 1787 The New-York Packet
28	The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)Hamilton argues that force may sometimes be needed, but in a large federal republic the people, the states and the national government can check each other.	Hamilton	December 26, 1787 The Independent Journal
29	Concerning the MilitiaHamilton defends Congress’s power to organize, arm and discipline the militia, while the states appoint its officers and train it.	Hamilton	January 9, 1788 The Independent Journal
30	Concerning the General Power of TaxationHamilton begins the taxation papers: money is the lifeblood of government, so Congress needs a general power to tax rather than requisitions from the states.	Hamilton	December 28, 1787 The New-York Packet
31	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)Hamilton argues from first principles that a government responsible for an unlimited task needs an unlimited power to raise money, and that the states will keep their own taxing power.	Hamilton	January 1, 1788 The New-York Packet
32	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)Hamilton explains that the states keep their power to tax, except on imports and exports, because the Constitution gives the nation exclusive power only in three kinds of cases.	Hamilton	January 2, 1788 The Independent Journal
33	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)Hamilton defends the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause, saying they add nothing beyond what any grant of power implies.	Hamilton	January 2, 1788 The Independent Journal
34	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)Hamilton argues that shared taxing power will work, and that the nation must plan for the expenses of future wars, not just present needs.	Hamilton	January 4, 1788 The New-York Packet
35	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)Hamilton argues against limiting federal taxes to certain kinds, and answers the claim that the House will be too small to represent every class of people.	Hamilton	January 5, 1788 The Independent Journal
36	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)Hamilton finishes the taxation papers: representatives will know enough to tax wisely, double taxation can be avoided, and poll taxes are a resource he hopes never to use.	Hamilton	January 8, 1788 The New-York Packet
The Convention's task and republican principles (Nos. 37–40)
37	Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of GovernmentMadison explains why the Convention’s task was so hard: it had to join energy with liberty, draw lines between powers that cannot be drawn exactly, and balance large and small states.	Madison	January 11, 1788 The Daily Advertiser
38	The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan ExposedMadison argues that the Constitution’s critics disagree with each other, and that its flaws are small compared with the Articles’ defects.	Madison	January 12, 1788 The Independent Journal
39	The Conformity of the Plan to Republican PrinciplesMadison argues that the plan is republican, and that it is partly national and partly federal, depending on which part you examine.	Madison	January 16, 1788 The Independent Journal
40	On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and SustainedMadison answers the charge that the Convention went beyond its instructions, arguing that it was told to make the government adequate to the Union’s needs, and that the people’s approval is what counts.	Madison	January 18, 1788 The New-York Packet
The powers granted, and the states (Nos. 41–46)
41	General View of the Powers Conferred by The ConstitutionMadison begins a review of the powers given to the national government, starting with war, armies, the navy and taxation, and defends the General Welfare Clause as limited by the list that follows it.	Madison	January 19, 1788 The Independent Journal
42	The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further ConsideredMadison reviews foreign relations and commerce powers, the clause on the slave trade, and powers that keep peace among the states, such as regulating interstate commerce, coinage, naturalization and bankruptcy.	Madison	January 22, 1788 The New-York Packet
43	The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)Madison reviews a group of other powers: copyrights and patents, the seat of government, treason, new states, the territories, the guarantee of republican government, debts, amendment, and ratification by nine states.	Madison	January 23, 1788 The Independent Journal
44	Restrictions on the Authority of the Several StatesMadison explains the limits on the states, such as no coining money or impairing contracts, and defends the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause.	Madison	January 25, 1788 The New-York Packet
45	The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments ConsideredMadison argues that the states have little to fear from the Union: the national government’s powers are few and defined, while the states’ are numerous and indefinite.	Madison	January 26, 1788 The Independent Journal
46	The Influence of the State and Federal Governments ComparedMadison argues that the people’s loyalty will favor the states, and that if the national government overreached, the states and an armed population could resist.	Madison	January 29, 1788 The New-York Packet
Separation of powers and checks and balances (Nos. 47–51)
47	The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different PartsMadison answers the charge that the Constitution mixes the branches together, explaining what Montesquieu’s maxim of separation of powers really requires.	Madison	January 30, 1788 The Independent Journal
48	These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each OtherMadison argues that written boundaries between the branches are not enough, because the legislature especially tends to draw all power into its “impetuous vortex.”	Madison	February 1, 1788 The New-York Packet
49	Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a ConventionMadison considers Jefferson’s idea of calling a convention whenever two branches agree that the Constitution has been broken, and rejects it as unsettling and unlikely to work.	Madison disputed	February 2, 1788 The Independent Journal
50	Periodical Appeals to the People ConsideredMadison rejects regular, scheduled reviews of the Constitution, using Pennsylvania’s Council of Censors as an example of how such reviews get caught up in party politics.	Madison disputed	February 5, 1788 The New-York Packet
51	The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different DepartmentsMadison explains how the structure of the government will keep each branch in check: ambition must be made to counteract ambition.	Madison disputed	February 6, 1788 The Independent Journal
The House of Representatives and elections (Nos. 52–61)
52	The House of RepresentativesThe paper begins the study of the House of Representatives: who may vote and serve, and why two-year terms keep members dependent on the people.	Madison disputed	February 8, 1788 The New-York Packet
53	The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)The paper answers the saying “where annual elections end, tyranny begins,” arguing that national lawmakers need two years to learn their work.	Madison disputed	February 9, 1788 The Independent Journal
54	The Apportionment of Members Among the StatesThe paper explains the three-fifths clause, which counted three of every five enslaved people for both representation and direct taxes, by presenting the argument a Southern advocate would make.	Madison disputed	February 12, 1788 The New-York Packet
55	The Total Number of the House of RepresentativesThe paper answers the charge that a House of 65 members is too small to be safe, arguing that very large assemblies become mobs and that the House will grow with the population.	Madison disputed	February 13, 1788 The Independent Journal
56	The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)The paper argues that a small House can still know enough about the people’s interests, because federal laws deal mainly with trade, taxes and the militia.	Madison disputed	February 16, 1788 The Independent Journal
57	The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with RepresentationThe paper answers the charge that the House will be run by a wealthy few: the electors are the many, anyone may be chosen, and members must live under the laws they make.	Madison disputed	February 19, 1788 The New-York Packet
58	Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands ConsideredThe paper answers the fear that the House will not grow as the population grows, pointing to the census and to the House’s power over money; it also defends majority rule.	Madison disputed	February 20, 1788 The Independent Journal
59	Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of MembersHamilton defends Congress’s power to alter state rules on the times, places and manner of federal elections, saying every government must be able to preserve itself.	Hamilton	February 22, 1788 The New-York Packet
60	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)Hamilton argues that Congress could not use its election power to favor the rich or any class, because the people, the states and the Senate’s structure stand in the way.	Hamilton	February 23, 1788 The Independent Journal
61	The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)Hamilton finishes the Elections Clause papers, comparing it with state constitutions and arguing for a uniform national election day.	Hamilton	February 26, 1788 The New-York Packet
The Senate (Nos. 62–66)
62	The SenateThe paper explains the Senate: older members with longer citizenship, chosen by state legislatures, with equal votes for each state, to bring stability and wisdom to lawmaking.	Madison disputed	February 27, 1788 The Independent Journal
63	The Senate ContinuedThe paper argues that a Senate with long terms helps the nation keep its reputation abroad, take long-term responsibility, and resist temporary popular errors.	Madison disputed	March 1, 1788 The Independent Journal
64	The Powers of the SenateJay defends giving the President and the Senate together the power to make treaties, with two-thirds of senators agreeing.	Jay	March 5, 1788 The Independent Journal
65	The Powers of the Senate ContinuedHamilton explains why the Senate tries impeachments: such cases are political, and the Senate is the body most likely to be fair and independent.	Hamilton	March 7, 1788 The New-York Packet
66	Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further ConsideredHamilton answers objections to the Senate’s role in impeachments: that it mixes powers, makes the Senate too strong, and puts senators in judgment of officials they helped appoint.	Hamilton	March 8, 1788 The Independent Journal
The President (Nos. 67–77)
67	The Executive DepartmentHamilton begins the papers on the presidency by accusing critics of painting the President as a king, and corrects one claim about filling Senate vacancies.	Hamilton	March 11, 1788 The New-York Packet
68	The Mode of Electing the PresidentHamilton defends the Electoral College: electors chosen for one purpose will weigh the candidates with care, and the process will favor able and well-known men.	Hamilton	March 12, 1788 The Independent Journal
69	The Real Character of the ExecutiveHamilton compares the President with the king of Great Britain and the governor of New York to show that the President’s powers are limited.	Hamilton	March 14, 1788 The New-York Packet
70	The Executive Department Further ConsideredHamilton’s famous defense of a single, energetic executive: one person acts with decision and speed, and cannot hide behind a council.	Hamilton	March 15, 1788 The Independent Journal
71	The Duration in Office of the ExecutiveHamilton argues that a four-year term gives the President enough independence to resist passing public moods and legislative pressure.	Hamilton	March 18, 1788 The New-York Packet
72	The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive ConsideredHamilton argues against term limits for the President: re-eligibility rewards good conduct, keeps experience, and avoids dangerous temptations.	Hamilton	March 19, 1788 The Independent Journal
73	The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto PowerHamilton defends a fixed presidential salary and the qualified veto, which guards against hasty or unwise laws and protects the executive from the legislature.	Hamilton	March 21, 1788 The New-York Packet
74	The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the ExecutiveHamilton briefly defends the President’s role as commander in chief, the power to ask cabinet officers for written opinions, and the pardon power, including for treason.	Hamilton	March 25, 1788 The New-York Packet
75	The Treaty-Making Power of the ExecutiveHamilton defends treaty-making by the President with two-thirds of the Senate, arguing that the power is neither purely executive nor purely legislative.	Hamilton	March 26, 1788 The Independent Journal
76	The Appointing Power of the ExecutiveHamilton defends presidential nomination of officers with Senate consent: one person will choose more carefully, and the Senate will check favoritism.	Hamilton	April 1, 1788 The New-York Packet
77	The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive ConsideredHamilton finishes the executive papers, says the Senate’s consent would be needed to remove officers as well as appoint them, and reviews the President’s remaining duties.	Hamilton	April 2, 1788 The Independent Journal
The courts (Nos. 78–83)
78	The Judiciary DepartmentHamilton’s defense of judges who serve during good behavior, and the classic early argument for judicial review: courts must treat the Constitution as a higher law than ordinary statutes.	Hamilton	May 28, 1788 McLean's book edition, volume 2
79	The Judiciary ContinuedHamilton defends fixed salaries for judges that cannot be cut, and explains that judges can be removed only by impeachment, not for old age or vague charges of inability.	Hamilton	May 28, 1788 McLean's book edition, volume 2
80	The Powers of the JudiciaryHamilton explains how far federal judicial power should reach: cases under the Constitution and federal laws, cases involving the nation, disputes between states and between citizens of different states, and maritime cases.	Hamilton	May 28, 1788 McLean's book edition, volume 2
81	The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial AuthorityHamilton answers Brutus’s warning that the Supreme Court would be uncontrollable, explains inferior courts and appellate review, and says states cannot be sued without their consent.	Hamilton	May 28, 1788 McLean's book edition, volume 2
82	The Judiciary ContinuedHamilton explains how state and federal courts will share work: state courts keep their jurisdiction unless the Constitution takes it away, and appeals can go from state courts to the Supreme Court.	Hamilton	May 28, 1788 McLean's book edition, volume 2
83	The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by JuryHamilton answers the most effective objection to the Constitution, that it does not guarantee jury trials in civil cases, arguing that silence does not abolish juries and that a single national rule would be hard to write.	Hamilton	May 28, 1788 McLean's book edition, volume 2
Objections answered, including the bill of rights (Nos. 84)
84	Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and AnsweredHamilton answers the demand for a bill of rights: the Constitution already protects many rights, and listing others could be dangerous by implying powers that were never granted.	Hamilton	May 28, 1788 McLean's book edition, volume 2
Conclusion (Nos. 85)
85	Concluding RemarksHamilton concludes the series: the plan is not perfect but is the best that can be had; it should be adopted now, and amended afterward if needed.	Hamilton	May 28, 1788 McLean's book edition, volume 2

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Sources

Texts: Project Gutenberg eBook #1404, The Federalist Papers (transcribed by the Constitution Society and volunteers), read from the Internet Archive’s copy; paragraph counts checked against the 1818 Gideon and 1863 Dawson editions on Wikisource. Publication dates and newspapers: Center for the Study of the American Constitution, University of Wisconsin–Madison, “The Federalist: printings” (archive.csac.history.wisc.edu), checked against each paper’s day of the week. Authorship and the disputed papers: “The Federalist Papers,” Wikipedia, and the sources it cites, including Douglass Adair, “The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers,” William and Mary Quarterly (1944), and Frederick Mosteller and David L. Wallace, “Inference in an Authorship Problem,” Journal of the American Statistical Association (1963). Supreme Court citation count: as reported in the same Wikipedia article. All introductions, summaries and questions are original to Teddy Rook Book.

What they were

The authors

Alexander Hamilton (1755 or 1757–1804)

James Madison (1751–1836)

John Jay (1745–1829)

The disputed papers, and how scholars settled them

The plan of the work

The most-read papers

No. 1: General Introduction

No. 10: The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)

No. 39: The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles

No. 47: The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts

No. 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments

No. 70: The Executive Department Further Considered

No. 78: The Judiciary Department

No. 84: Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered