Article IV, Section 2 says: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." You saw it among the rules of interstate relations in Civics and Government. It overlaps with the dormant Commerce Clause but works differently: it protects people who are citizens of other states, it has a clear textual basis, and it has no market participant exception.
Why it works
| Step | Question |
|---|---|
| 1 | Does the law discriminate against citizens of other states (often by residency)? |
| 2 | Does it burden a "privilege" protected by the clause: one fundamental to national unity, such as pursuing a common calling or doing business? |
| 3 | If so, is there a substantial reason for the difference, and does the discrimination bear a substantial relationship to it (are nonresidents a peculiar source of the problem; are there less restrictive means)? |
Key idea
Worked example: Toomer v. Witsell (1948)
- Step 1: the fee discriminates against nonresidents.
- Step 2: commercial shrimping is a common calling, earning a living: a protected privilege.
- Step 3: the state pointed to conservation and enforcement costs, but nothing showed nonresidents caused a special problem, and a hundredfold difference was not closely related to any extra cost.
Answer: Invalid. A state may charge nonresidents more to cover real extra costs, but not a fee that shuts them out.
Worked example: Recreation versus livelihood: Baldwin (1978)
- Step 1: yes, the fee discriminates against nonresidents.
- Step 2: recreational big-game hunting is not fundamental to the nation as a single entity; it is not a way of earning a living.
- So the clause does not apply, and the law stands.
Answer: Upheld, because the privilege at stake was not fundamental. Compare Piper (1985): practicing law is a common calling, so New Hampshire could not limit bar admission to residents.
Common mistake